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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROD C. SLATER, 
Petitioner & Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Dept. of Human Services, 
CINDY HAAG, Director, and 
CHRIS MEGALONKIS, H.E.A.T. 
Supervisor, etal., 
Respondents & Appellees, 
Case No. 930443-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petition for judicial review of administrative order. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court Order in Civil 920903097CV, dated 
June 9, 1993, reads as follows: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Peti-
tioner's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the action herein is 
dismissed with prejudice." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
To vacate dismissal with prejudice and order the Court below 
to grant Appellant's Motion to Dismiss his Petition without preju-
dice . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 1, 1992, Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
of Administrative Order in Third District Court seeking redress from 
an adverse Decision and Order issued by the Office of Administrative 
Hearings on April 30, 1992. The following is a summary of the pro-
ceedings which took place thereafter in this case: 
6/22/92 Filed: Answer to Petition 
7/16/92 Filed: Motion for Scheduling Conference 
7/22/92 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
8/17/92 ICC scheduled for 9/14/92 at 1115 A in room M with JSS 
5/7/93 Order to Show Cause — No. 1 
OSC scheduled for 5/19/93 at 0900 A in room A with TEM 
5/20/93 ORL scheduled for 6/7/93 at 9:00 A in room A with TEM 
Filed: Motion to Dismiss 
6/7/93 Filed: Minute Entry — Court Orders Petitioner's Motion to 
Dismiss Granted with Prejudice 
Case Judgment is Other 
Case Disposition is Dismissed 
6/9/93 Filed: Order 
7/8/93 931300202 Notice of Appeal fee 160.00 
Filed: Notice of Appeal 
Filed: Undertaking Bond No. 1097678 
7/9/93 Note: Sent Copy of Notice to Court of Appeals 
7/19/93 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals No. 930443-CA 
End of the Docket Report for this case. 
The foregoing entries are the dates and filings taken from the 
Docket Report in this case for the entire period it remained in 
Third District Court—from 6/1/92 until the final Order was filed 
on 6/9/93. These docket entries clearly indicate that little or 
no litigation of any real consequence took place throughout these 
proceedings until Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss his Petition. 
-2-
There was no discovery, no admissions, no interrogatories, no motions 
or pleadings of any kind that could be considered a burden on the 
Respondents. The only response expected from the Respondents was 
their Answer, which was filed on 6/22/92, and a request for a Schedu-
ling Conference subsequently held on 9/14/92. 
This case never reached the merits. The State submitted no 
pleadings other than its Answer. Again, the facts of the case make 
it clear that the Respondents were under no burden or any pressure 
from Appellant throughout these proceedings that would justify the 
Court ordering a dismissal with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The record in this case brings into focus the fact that the 
Court-ordered Dismissal with prejudice was unreasonable and un-
warranted. Whenever it becomes clear that a trial Court has, 
without just cause, issued a decree that is too severe, unsound and 
contrary to both precedent and principle, the remedy on appeal for 
such an abuse of judicial discretion must be the reversal of such 
a decree. 
POINT II 
At the outset, it should be stated that the sole issue before 
this Court is whether the record indicates that Appellant's conduct 
in this case could, in any way, be construed as a refusal to obey 
Court orders, or any other form of misconduct so flagrant that it 
would warrant such a harsh judicial measure as a dismissal with 
prejudice. 
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Moving to case law, 8 of the cases cited by Appellant in sup-
port of his position in this appeal are Utah cases. Citing the 
most recent of these cases first, this Court upheld the decision 
of the Third District Court wherein the action had been dismissed 
for a failure to prosecute, not once, but twice, involving litiga-
tion between the same two parties dating back to April of 1983, 
a period exceeding 8 years! See Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah App.1991). 
The above lawsuit, for a breach of contract by a corporation 
against a State-owned university and other departments and divisions 
of State government, had to have taken at least a moderate amount 
of time, money and effort to defend. And yet the trial Court dis-
missed the plaintiff's action without prejudice — not once, but 
twice — which appeared to cause some concern to the Court of Ap-
peals. Specifically whether, under the circumstances, Meadow Fresh 
Farms, Inc., would be at liberty to file suit for a third time based 
on the same claims against the same State defendants. 
Although the appellate opinion comprehensively covers the Meadow 
Fresh matter, including numerous citations in support of its decision 
to uphold the Order of the trial Court to dismiss the case for failure 
to prosecute, the fact remains that the dismissal was still without 
prejudice, with no suggestion whatsoever that the case should be re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the suit "with" prejudice. The 
lower Court Order of Dismissal without prejudice would stand. On 
the possibility of the Meadow Fresh Plaintiffs filing a third action, 
the Court of Appeals remained non-committal, stating: "We decline 
to render an opinion on the propriety of refiling an action more 
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than once pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40." 
There are certain similarities in Bills v. U.S., 857 F.2d 1404 
(10th Cir.1988) to the Meadow Fresh case. Plaintiff-Appellant Bills, 
who was suing the Federal Government for damages, but failed to fol-
low certain Court orders, causing too many delays over several years, 
resulted in the U.S. District Court for Utah dismissing the case 
for lack of prosecution. Once again, the Defendants (United States), 
had no alternative — time and federal funds would have to be spent 
for a legal defense against Mr. Bills. Nevertheless, when Federal 
Judge Aldon Anderson finally dismissed the case, the Dismissal was 
without prejudice — upheld on appeal to the 10th Circuit. 
Turning to Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 
1017 (Utah S.Ct.1986), the Utah Supreme Court said; 
"While the court below properly exercised its dis-
cretion in dismissing plaintiff's action for failing 
to comply with Rule 19(a), it was improper to do so 
with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy when it pre-
cludes a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on 
their merits. Our rules of procedure are intended 
to encourage the adjudication of disputes on their 
merits."" (Emphasis added) 
"Not having considered the merits of plaintiff's 
claims, there was no reason for the court to dis-
miss with prejudice and prevent future considera-
tion of the claims should the defect be corrected. 
The trial court abused its discretion by entering 
its Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice." (Empha-
sis added. See 728 P.2d at p.1020) 
In Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah S.Ct.1977), the Appellants 
are represented by Salt Lake civil rights attorney Brian Barnard. Utah 
Supreme Court Justice Wilkins, in writing the opinion for the Court, 
quoted Justice Crockett from the text of the opinion in Westinghouse 
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Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 
(Utah S.Ct.1975), and cases cited therein: 
"It is not to be doubted that in order to handle 
the business of the court with efficiency and expe-
dition the trial court should have a reasonable lati-
tude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prose-
cute if a party fails to move forward according to 
the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse. ...Whether there is such jus-
tifiable excuse is to be determined by considering 
more factors than merely the length of time since 
the suit was filed. Some consideration should be 
given to the conduct of both parties, and to the 
opportunity each has had to move the case forward 
. . . also what difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused to the other side; and most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." 
(Emphasis added. See 561 P.2d at 1076) 
The following Utah case was in litigation almost 5 years. See 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah S.Ct.1977). In writing 
for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Ellett began: 
"The sole issue presented on this appeal is this: 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismiss-
ing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice for 
lack of prosecution?" 
Later, the Chief Justice refers to Crystal Lime & Cement Co. 
v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct.1959), in quoting from that 
opinion: 
"Since any party to this action could have ob-
tained the relief to which it was entitled at any 
time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally 
for a number of years, it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the court to grant respondents1 motion 
to dismiss with prejudice." (571 P.2d at p.1369) 
Westinghouse (See citation above) is a case that has been cited 
extensively throughout Utah law books. For example, see the Meadow 
Fresh case and Polk v. Ivers, supra. And on occasion, Westinghouse 
has also been cited as a sound authority regarding abuse of dis-
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cretion as it relates to dismissals in numerous other jurisdictions 
as well. One of the most important passages, among several to be 
found in the Westinghouse opinion, reads as follows: 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in 
order to keep them up to date. But it is even 
more important to keep in mind that the very reason 
for the existence of courts is to afford dispu-
tants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice 
between them." (Emphasis added. See 544 P.2d at 879) 
Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct. 
1959), is yet another case that has been cited repeatedly through-
out Utah's recent case histories regarding the subject of dis-
missals and abuse of discretion. Quoting from the opening summary 
to the case on page 624 of the Reporter: 
"...The Supreme Court, Wade, J., held that defen-
dants were not harassed and annoyed by plaintiff's 
failure to draw and present to trial court find-
ings of facts, conclusions of law. . . and it was 
an abuse of discretion for trial court about eight 
years later to grant defendants' motion to dis-
miss action with prejudice." 
The eighth and final Utah case is Wright v. Howe, 150 P. 956 
(Utah S.Ct.1915), a very interesting old case to study, wherein cer-
tain legal principles firmly upheld in 1915 are still adhered to 
in appellate decisions today. In 1915 the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"The defendants had the same right to press the 
action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they 
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and 
expecially in the absence of any showing of preju-
dice, they cannot complain." At page 956. 
"Merely failing to promptly prosecute an action 
is not sufficient to show prejudice. This is es-
pecially true where the defendant may himself press 
the action to trial. Appellant could have done 
that at any time within the three years the action 
was pending. This court, in a number of decisions, 
has clearly indicated that it is the policy of the 
law to have cases tried and determined upon the 
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merits whenever such a course is possible, and where 
it does not clearly invade the rights of one of the 
parties." (Emphasis added at p. 959) 
The foregoing represents a basic legal opinion that is right 
on point, and as sound now as when it was written nearly 80 years 
ago. 
There are many other cases that support Appellant's position 
in this appeal. They begin in alphabetical order with Bruce v. 
Grace Hospital, 293 N.W. 2d 654 (Mich. App.1980) where the plain-
tiffs were granted a dismissal "without" prejudice even though the 
case had been in litigation for several years. The decision with-
stood an appeal by the defendants. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
cites Wright & Miller in support of its decision. Quoting headnote 
#2: "Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting plaintiffs1 motion to dismiss without 
prejudice in order to allow plaintiffs, who had 
substituted counsel, sufficient time in which to 
obtain second evaluation of their medical malprac-
tice action, even though action had been pending 
for over five years and had been adjourned sev-
eral times at plaintiffs' request." At p. 654. 
Conafay v. Wyeth Laboratories, 841 F. 2d 417 (D.C. Cir.1988) 
represents a clear and concise, well-written decision discussing 
relevant issues that closely relate to the present case. The D.C. 
Circuit said this: 
"Granting voluntary dismissal would mean that 
appellee would lose an opportunity for a favor-
able final disposition of the case, but that is 
not important as long as appellee suffers no le-
gal prejudice from dismissal." At p. 420. 
"For these reasons, the court is convinced 
the case is an appropriate one for voluntary 
dismissal. The case is remanded to the district 
court with instructions to dismiss it without 
prejudice." At p. 421. 
Davis v. Operation Amigo, Inc. , 378 F. 2d 101 (10th Cir.1967) had 
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its origin in U.S. District Court in our sister State of Wyoming where 
the plaintiffs appealed an adverse decision to the 10th Circuit in 
Denver. There, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated: 
". . .A dismissal, with prejudice, is a harsh sanc-
tion and should be resorted to only in extreme cases. 
No precise rule can be laid down as to what circum-
stances justify a dismissal for failure to prosecute 
but the procedural history of each case must be ex-
amined in order to make such determination. The 
judge must be ever mindful that the policy of the 
law favors the hearing of a litigant's claim upon 
the merits." (In the foregoing passage, the 10th 
Circuit also refers to Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 
269. See 378 F.2d at p.103. Emphasis added) 
In Dome Laboratories v. Farrell, 599 P.2d 152 (Alaska S.Ct.1979), 
the Plaintiffs (Farrells) sued the Defendants (Dome Laboratories) 
for medical malpractice, then decided to file a Motion to Dismiss 
their case without prejudice — which was granted — and upheld on 
appeal. In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska gave further cre-
dence to its decision favoring the Plaintiffs when stating: 
11
. . . the lack of any demonstrable prejudice to ap-
pellants, persuades us that a satisfactory basis has 
been demonstrated for concluding that the superior 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the 
motion for voluntary dismissal." At p.159. 
". . . Given the particular factual circumstances of 
this case, we hold that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney's 
fees to appellant as a term or condition of its grant 
of the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal." 
At p.160. 
Douthitt v. Garrison, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio App.1981), is another 
relevant case where the plaintiffs appealed and won a reversal of a 
lower Court Order which had denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss 
their complaint without prejudice. The Ohio Court of Appeals said: 
" . . . A refusal by the court to consider any equities 
of the plaintiff is a denial of full and complete exer-
cise of judicial discretion; recent cases have held that 
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equities of the plaintiff should be given whatever 
weight they deserve. Wright & Miller, supra. While 
we rocognize that this situation has been brought 
about by the actions of plaintiffs' counsel, none-
theless, we believe that justice requires under 
these circumstances that the plaintiffs be granted 
their full day in court." (Emphasis added at p.1071) 
Also see the pertinent paragraph under headnote #7: 
"Trial court erred when it failed to grant plain-
tiffs1 request for a dismissal without prejudice of 
their action arising out of an automobile accident 
where there was no prejudice to defendant other than 
the prospect of a second lawsuit, and plaintiffs 
would suffer great prejudice since their main causes 
of action would be forever barred. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 41(A)(2). (Emphasis added at p.1068) 
The next citation includes a well-balanced, comprehensive dis-
cussion concerning attorney fees, how much, and under what circum-
stances they should, or should not, be paid. See Dunn v. Fred A. Mik-
kelson, Inc., 276 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. S.Ct.1979) wherein a motion for 
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was granted to the plaintiffs 
and upheld on appeal even though the case had apparently been in liti-
gation nearly 3 years. In reference to attorney fees, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin said: 
"We conclude that factors to be considered in 
assessing attorney fees against a plaintiff in a 
voluntary dismissal include (1) the utility of 
the work performed for future proceedings should 
the plaintiff reinstate the action; (2) the good 
faith of the plaintiff; (3) the stage to which 
the proceedings had progressed; (4) the complexi-
ty of the work performed; (5) whether it would 
result in undue hardship on the plaintiff; and 
(6) any factors which would result in unique pre-
judice to the defendant." At p.754. 
The next case, adjudicated in the 5th Circuit, has been cited 
numerous times in many jurisdictions throughout the country. Refer-
ring to an abuse of discretion, Judge Wisdom, writing for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals declared: ". . . In exercising its 
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discretion the court follows the traditional prin-
ciple that dismissal should be allowed unless the 
defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice 
other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. 
It is no bar to dismissal that plaintiff may ob-
tain some tactical advantage thereby." (Quoting 
from Wright & Miller at p.368. Emphasis added) 
"The record does not disclose any prejudice to the 
defendant, had a voluntary dismissal been granted, 
other than the annoyance of a second litigation 
upon the same subject matter." 
"Accordingly, we hold that the district court 
exceeded the bounds of judicial discretion in dis-
missing the complaint with prejudice. We reverse 
and remand with instructions that the case be re-
instated. " (At p.369 with emphasis added) 
The foregoing excerpts are from the opinion in Durham v. Florida 
East Coast Railway Company, 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1967). 
Another 5th Circuit case often cited in related decisions is 
Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 
1968). Quoting the Court: 
". . . The exercise of the authority is discretion-
ary, and is subject to review for abuse of discre-
tion. Dismissal of an action with prejudice and 
entry of judgment by default are drastic renedies 
which should be used only in extreme situations,. ." 
(At p.887. Emphasis added). 
"This Court, while recognizing and enforcing 
the exercise of the power of final disposition 
of litigation as a sanction in some cases, has 
adopted the view that such action is too harsh 
except in extreme circumstances. It has gener-
ally followed the more modern tenor appearing 
in the following quotation from the opinion in 
the recent case of Durham v. Florida East Coast 
Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, where Judge Wisdom, after 
recognizing the inherent power now under discus-
sion, said: "* * * The decided cases, while not-
ing that dismissal is a discretionary matter, 
have generally permitted it only in the face of 
a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct 
by the plaintiff * * *" (At p.888. Em. added) 
Several sound legal points are discussed in Flynn v. Church of 
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. S.Ct.1977) that sup-
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port Appellant's position in the instant case. See headnotes #5 and 
#9 in the Northeastern Reporter: 
"Delay of less than two years from plaintiff's 
filing of suit to plaintiff's motion for volun-
tary dismissal was not so unreasonable as to con-
stitute an abuse, particularly in light of ab-
sence of any effort of defendants to move case 
along, and thus, did not require dismissal of case 
with prejudice. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(a)(1,2) . " 
(At p.409) 
"A plaintiff, having moved to dismiss volun-
tarily, and being faced with conditions he finds 
too onerous, may, if he acts promptly, decline to 
have action dismissed and go forward on merits. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(a)(1,2)." (At p.410) 
Kovalic v. Dec. Intern., Inc., 855 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.1988) is a 
unique case in many respects and worthy of study as it relates to 
the issues at hand. Plaintiff Kovalic moved for a voluntary dismis-
sal of his age discrimination suit filed in Federal District Court, 
which was readily granted even though the Federal District judge 
knew that this Plaintiff had filed an identical action in State Court 
and would press his case in that forum. This decision was upheld on 
appeal to the 7th Circuit. See headnote #3: 
"Prospect of facing subsequent lawsuit in state 
rather than federal court does not constitute pre-
judice making it abuse of district court's discre-
tion to grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss fed-
eral action without prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A." (At p.472) 
Appellant has already cited Laurie v. Ezard, 595 S.W.2d 336 
(Mo. App.1980) in his Docketing Statement as a relevant case in point, 
and submits this case again, quoting the following closing passages 
found on p.338 of the appellate opinion in Laurie: 
". . . 'But, desirable as it is that courts should 
keep their dockets current, it is of greater impor-
tance that their work should be done with care and 
discernment and that they should be ever diligent 
-12-
and zealous in their unremitting efforts to attain 
the ends of justice.'" 
"We believe here that the ends of justice will be 
better served by allowing the case to proceed on its 
merits rather than to be determined without the par-
ties having an opportunity to present evidence and 
to be otherwise heard." 
"The order dismissing the case is reversed and 
the cause is remanded for further proceedings." 
LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir.1976) is another 
case that has been cited in scores of dismissal actions. LeCompte 
has been referred to repeatedly because in this 5th Circuit opinion 
the Court stressed the importance of the basic rights that Courts 
must protect in behalf of both parties — there must be equity, not 
"legal prejudice." 
In Lowe v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 897 F.2d 272 (7th Cir.1990), 
we have another case that is right on point, particularly regarding 
a Court's abuse of discretion: 
". . . 'The district court should consider less se-
vere sanctions than dismissal for a party's non-
compliance with court orders or failure to prose-
cute his or her claim expeditiously, unless there 
exists a clear record of delay or contumacious con-
duct or when less drastic sanctions have proven in-
effective. '" (At p.274) 
"The district court abused its discretion in 
dismissing Mr. Lowe's suit and denying his motion 
for a continuance. Consequently, we reverse, re-
instate Mr. Lowe's action and remand. Circuit Rule 
36 shall apply." (At p.275) 
In McCombs v. Pittsburgh—Pes Moines Steel Company, 426 F.2d 264 
(10th Cir.1970), the U.S. District Court for Colorado dismissed the 
action for a failure to prosecute and Plaintiff McCombs appealed. The 
10th Circuit reversed the District Court decision and remanded with 
orders to reinstate the action. The 10th Circuit quoted from its 
opinion in Davis, supra, 378 F.2d 101 at 103. (See p.266 in McCombs). 
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This concludes Appellant's discussion of his case citations 
separately. Time does not permit further review of each case in-
dividually. Therefore, the remainder of Appellant's citations will 
be submitted alphabetically as follows: 
Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.1963); Mely v. Morris, 
409 P.2d 979 (Alaska S.Ct.1966); Ordnance Gauge Co. v. Jacquard Knitting 
Machine Co., 21 F.R.D. 575 (E.D. Penn.1958); Palmer v. City of Decatur, 
111., 814 F.2d 426 (7th Cir.1987); Peardon v. Chapman, 169 F.2d 909 
(3rd Cir.1948); Richman v. General Motors Corporation, 437 F.2d 196 
(1st Cir.1971); Stevedoring Services of America v. Armilla Intern., 
889 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.1989); Syracuse Broadcasting Corporation v. New-
house, 271 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir.1959); Transit Casualty Company v. Security 
Trust Company, 396 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.1968); Tyco laboratories, Inc. v. 
Koppers Co. , Inc. , 627 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. E.I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 490 (N.D. Ill. ,E .D. 1953) ; Woods v. 
Murdock, 441 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. App.1989) . 
Each of the foregoing cases, emanating from both State and Fed-
eral jurisdictions throughout the entire country, are closely relevant 
to the instant issue, namely: abuse of judicial discretion as it re-
lates to Dismissals. For example, note what a Federal District Court 
had to say in the Ordnance Gauge case, supra, 21 F.R.D. at p.577: 
". . . The motion under Rule 41(b) was filed after 
receipt of notice from the Clerk, required by the 
local rule, that the case would be deemed abandoned 
unless application was made to the Court. If this 
application be denied, as I think it should be in 
this case, the cause of action would under the rule 
have to be dismissed without prejudice. It seems 
anomalous and unfair that a plaintiff who, when noti-
fied of the impending dismissal of his case, moved 
promptly (though unsuccessfully) to avoid the pen-
alty, should find himself, by the defendant's be-
lated action, in a worse position than if he had 
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done nothing and permitted his action to be dismissed 
without protest. " 
For another opinion that is equally, if not even closer to the 
issue at hand, in fact, what follows is right on the mark. See 
Peardon v. Chapman, supra, 169 F.2d at p.913: 
". . . Based on the Court's first expression it 
would seem that appellant anticipated nothing more 
drastic than a dismissal without prejudice. With 
no warning of the Court's uncommunicated change 
of thought as to dismissal, she was not afforded 
an opportunity of protecting her cause of action. 
Under all the facts, in view of the intimation 
of dismissal without prejudice and of a situation 
thereafter arising less blameworthy than in the 
first instance, the dismissal with prejudice of 
plaintiff-appellant's cause of action was unwar-
ranted. " (Emphasis added) 
In the last two cases just cited, Ordnance Gauge and Peardon v. 
Chapman, the Federal judges writing the opinions in those cases made 
it clear that it is unfair for a Court to lead a litigant toward one 
form of judicial action, and then suddenly impose something entirely 
different, particularly when the litigant is surprised to learn that 
he or she is now facing a Court-ordered sanction that is unreasonable 
and far too severe. 
The action taken by the Court below in the instant case is close-
ly comparable to what took place in the two Eastern cases just dis-
cussed, Ordnance Gauge and Peardon, where the plaintiffs sought re-
dress — which they rightfully deserved — and were granted. 
This Court should be informed as to exactly what took place dur-
ing the hearing to Show Cause held on Wednesday, May 19, 1993, fol-
lowed by the Motion hearing on Monday, June 7, 1993 in Third District 
Court with Judge Medley presiding. The Transcript (see Addendum) 
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covers the May 19 hearing in about one and \ pages. First of all, 
Appellant received an Order through the mail to appear before Judge 
Medley on May 19 and show cause why, as the Plaintiff (Petitioner) 
in a civil action that had been pending for several months, the 
case was not moving forward. Appellant responded to that Show Cause 
Order and appeared on the morning of May 19 as instructed. 
The Transcript of the proceedings held on the 19th makes.it 
obvious that Appellant had little or no knowledge as to legal pro-
cedure regarding dismissals. Appellant was relying almost entirely 
on instructions from the Bench concerning the correct way to pro-
ceed in filing a Motion to Dismiss. Again, the Transcript makes it 
clear that here was a citizen-litigant appearing in Court, as ordered, 
and simply asking the judge what the Court required of him to remove 
his case from the active Court calendar. 
The Transcript indicates Judge Medley saying that a "timely no-
tice" was to be sent to the State notifying the Respondents that Ap-
pellant would be filing a Motion to Dismiss his Petition. (See p.l, 
line 25 of the Transcript). Later, Judge Medley said, "I will give 
you ten days from today to get that taken care of." (See p.2, lines 
13 & 14). 
Although Appellant was given 10 days to file his Motion, he filed 
it the next day, May 20, including the Notice which stated the Motion 
would be heard on July 7, 1993 at 9:00 A.M. By filing so promptly 
following the Show Cause hearing, the Respondents were thus given at 
least 17—18 days to respond in writing if there was any objection to 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss his Petition "without" prejudice, which 
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was clearly stated in the Motion. 
From what began as a very simple legal procedure, the next turn 
of events began to complicate things considerably. First, the record 
will show that counsel for the Respondents did not appear at the 
Show Cause hearing. And second, following Appellant's filing of his 
Motion to Dismiss, the Respondents still remained silent concerning 
the terms of the Motion. There were no pleadings of objection filed, 
no letters or phone calls, nothing indicating that the State would 
suddenly make a move to change the terms of the Motion from a routine 
dismissal without prejudice to a dismissal with prejudice. If grant-
ed by the Court, a dismissal with prejudice would mean, even though 
there had been practically no litigation at all in this matter, that 
the original claims would have no legal standing whatsoever. It would 
be res judicata, barred from the Courts forever. 
On the morning of June 7, 1993, Appellant appeared in Court along 
with counsel for the Respondents, Carol Verdoia. However, what seemed 
a little odd, was the fact there was practically nobody else in the 
courtroom. As the Transcript indicates on the top of page 3, the 
first thing Judge Medley said after entering the courtroom was: 
"Letfs go to the No. 2 matter on the calendar, Slater vs. State of 
Utah, Case No. 920903097." 
Moving to line 8 of the Transcript on page 3, THE COURT: Mr. Sla-
ter, this is your Motion to Dismiss, sir? 
MR. SLATER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to add other than 
what is stated in the written pleadings that I have had a chance to 
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read? 
MR. SLATER: No, I think it is sufficient in my Motion to Dismiss, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Verdoia. 
MS. VERDOIA: I guess the only thing I would ask in a situation 
like this, do you normally dismiss without prejudice or --
THE COURT: In this particular situation, I would be dismissing 
the matter with prejudice. 
MS. VERDOIA: That is what I would have requested. 
Before quoting from the Transcript any further, there are some 
important questions that must be asked relating to the above exchange. 
What did Judge Medley mean when he said, "In this 'particular' situa-
tion, I would be dismissing the matter 'with' prejudice." What was 
so particular about this dismissal that justified the imposition of 
such a severe sanction? What did Ms. Verdoia mean when she said, "That 
is what I 'would' have requested." "Would" have requested? The fact 
is, counsel for the Respondents did not request that Appellant's case 
be dismissed with prejudice, by either a written pleading or in per-
son in Court. Ms. Verdoia did not appear at the Show Cause hearing 
on May 19. Therefore, when Appellant explained to Judge Medley on 
the 19th that he intended to file a Motion to Dismiss his action, 
neither the Court nor Appellant had any idea of whether this would 
be agreeable to the Respondents, because counsel for the State failed 
to appear. However, Ms. Verdoia had received Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss "without" prejudice at least 2 weeks or more prior to the 
hearing on the Motion set for June 7. Still no word from the Respon-
dents, either verbally or in writing, as to any adverse position the 
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State would take in opposition to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Regarding attorneys and matters in litigation, we all know when 
representing a client it is the duty of the attorney to employ the 
tactics which are in the best interest of the client. Given the 
foregoing, it may have been Ms.Verdoia's idea to object to Appel-
lant's Motion, using these vague tactics, (MS.VERDOIA: That is what 
I "would" have requested), or, on the other hand, this clever little 
maneuver could have been engineered by Ms.Verdoia's superiors. 
In any event, that issue really makes little or no difference 
because the final decision in legal disputes rests with the Court. 
Just as it is the responsibility and duty of a lawyer to fully rep-
resent the best interests of his or her client, the Court has a much 
greater responsibility, and duty, to remain impartial in protecting 
the interests of both parties on an equal basis. And Courts, in 
pragmatic terms, mean judges. In this instance, Judge Tyrone Medley. 
Returning to the Transcript, it becomes vividly clear that here 
was a layman, a person unfamiliar with the rules of courtroom pro-
cedure, attempting to plead what he believed were important points 
in behalf of his position, but in vain, because the matter had al-
ready been decided! Beginning on page 3, line 25, it reads as 
follows: 
MR. SLATER: Well, Your Honor, I request that it be dismissed 
without prejudice because I feel I was very sincere in filing this 
action and justified in filing this action, rather than just let the 
Court dismiss it as so many were here on the 19th--
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Mr. Slater. I think 
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this gets to the heart of the issue. This is your lawsuit and you 
are asking the Court to dismiss it, correct? 
MR. SLATER: That is correct. 
THE COURT: And what I am understanding from your request to have 
it dismissed at this time, Mr. Slater, is simply that you don't intend 
to re-file this case, do you? 
MR. SLATER: I don't intend to re-file this action, this particu-
lar action now, but it could be possibly a similar action some time 
in the future. As I mentioned in the motion, it is because of my 
income and I don't seek any further assistance from the state at this 
time. And I'd just like to say, Your Honor, that --
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, this is the point I am trying to get at 
and this is really not that complicated. You are asking the Court 
to dismiss this claim today, correct? 
MR. SLATER: Correct. 
THE COURT: Are you telling me that at some future date you think 
you intend to bring this claim again? This exact claim, not something 
that may happen in the future, but this claim? 
MR. SLATER: There is a possibility that the same kind of action 
could be filed later if the state and the case workers for the state 
were to take a similar action against me in the future. 
THE COURT: But that would be some future event and not this par-
ticular date alleged in the claim that is filed in this particular 
case. That would be some future event, correct? 
MR. SLATER: That is correct. 
MS. VERDOIA: And Mr. Slater won't be prohibited from filing an 
action based on a future claim. 
THE COURT: That is the point I am getting at. The dismissal 
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with prejudice, Mr. Slater, doesn't mean that you can't bring some 
future claim at a future date. It doesn't preclude you from access 
to the court for future events. 
MR. SLATER: The same kind of action is judicial review of an 
administrative order. That is what the original petition was. 
THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Slater, but the dismissal with pre-
judice does not operate as a bar for you to bring some future event, 
sir. 
MR. SLATER: I would like to add, Your Honor, that I felt that 
since so many of these are dismissed out of hand, that the Court may 
feel, as I saw in your Order to Show Cause hearings on the 19th, 
that there are so many of them dismissed that it would appear that 
some of these suits may be filed frivolously. I don't consider this 
a frivolous suit and I don't want the Court to consider that and 
that is why I filed the Motion to Dismiss. 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, your impressions are mistaken. When you 
appeared at the Order to Show Cause calendar, when those cases were 
dismissed for the parties' failure to appear, I passed no judgment 
whatsoever on the merits of the claims of those lawsuits. It is just 
the mere fact that the parties did not prosecute the action. 
So this case today, as I indicated, is dismissed. It is dis-
missed with prejudice. That does not operate as a bar for you having 
access to the courts for any future event that may or may not take 
place. (Emphasis added above) 
MR. SLATER: If I may just add one final thought to present, Your 
Honor. When I called your office to file a Notice of Motion to get 
the date, I asked about that very thing from your secretary or one of 
the staff members in your office, if those cases that were dismissed 
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on the Show Cause day that I appeared, I asked if those were dismis-
sed with or without prejudice and I was told that the vast majority 
of those are dismissed without prejudice. So I feel, Your Honor, 
that if I hadn't even appeared, it is quite possible this could have 
been dismissed without prejudice; and then I filed the motion to do 
it sincerely and in the best interest. I know there is a little 
more paperwork involved, but -- (Emphasis added) 
THE COURT: Well, the ruling is standing, Mr. Slater, because as 
you indicated, the only opportunity that you would have that you are 
even considering is some future event. And as I indicated to you, 
you are not precluded from filing some future action based on a 
future event. You are not precluded. And so for that reason, Mr. 
Slater, I am going to dismiss the matter and this particular case 
will be dismissed with prejudice. That doesn't mean that your claim 
was non-meritorious. It simply means that we are putting an end to 
this particular claim that is contained in this particular file, 
not anything in the future. (Emphasis added) 
MR. SLATER: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Slater. 
MS. VERDOIA: Would you like me to prepare an Order? 
THE COURT: Please. 
MS. VERDOIA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
In reviewing this exchange between Appellant and Judge Medley, 
Appellant was desperately trying to explain to the Judge that he had 
placed his faith in the Court, that he didn't consider his suit to 
be frivolous, and didn't want the Court to think that either. How-
-22-
ever, several factors had changed in recent months. Appellant's 
health and income had improved to the extent that he could avoid seek-
ing any further assistance from the State at this time. (See lines 
14 thru 19 on p. 4). Those were some of the reasons that Appellant 
had decided to file a Motion to Dismiss, which was also stated in the 
Motion which Judge Medley had read. (See p. 3, line 13). 
The evidence becomes conclusive right in the Transcript by sim-
ply reading Judge Medley's own words. The matter in dispute had been 
prejudged, settled before Appellant ever entered the courtroom. The 
case would be dismissed with prejudice in favor of the State of Utah 
even though the State had filed nothing in the Court below seeking 
such a dismissal!! If the Respondents didn't openly press for a dis-
missal with prejudice, while Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss with-
out prejudice, and then the Judge reverses the request of Appellant 
and orders that the case will be dismissed with prejudice, isn't that 
sufficiently compelling evidence that this case was not only prejudged, 
but the decision was blatantly biased in favor of the State? 
Appellant urges this Court to please study this Transcript. It 
is very short, only about 7 pages in length. Nowhere in this document 
does Judge Medley give any legal or logical reason for his Order to 
Dismiss Appellant's case with prejudice. What is even more convincing 
in showing the Court's bias, is seen on p. 6, lines 10 thru 16 of the 
Transcript: 
THE COURT: Mr. Slater, your impressions are mistaken. When you 
appeared at the Order to Show Cause calendar, when those cases were 
dismissed for the parties' failure to appear, I passed no judgment 
whatsoever on the merits of the claims of those lawsuits. It is 
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just the mere fact that the parties did not prosecute the action. Fol-
lowed by the Judge stating on lines 17 and 18: "So this case today, 
as I indicated, is dismissed. It is dismissed with prejudice." 
Why? Again, based on what logical or legal reason? The Judge 
had just finished saying, "I passed no judgment whatsoever on the 
merits of the claims of those lawsuits. It is just the mere fact 
that the parties did not prosecute the action." (In reference to 
the scores of cases he had dismissed without prejudice on May 19). 
What was the difference between the other cases and this case? The 
comparison is identical! This case never went to the "merits of the 
claims" made by Appellant prior to his Motion to Dismiss. "It is 
just the mere fact that the parties (also Appellant) did not prose-
cute the action." Thus, Judge Medley issued a Show Cause Order to 
this litigant just as he had to the other "parties" he refers to on 
lines 13 and 15, all of whose cases were dismissed without prejudice. 
The Clerk's records from the Third District Court indicate that 
Judge Medley's calendar consisted of seventy (70) cases scheduled to 
appear at his Show Cause hearing set for May 19, 1993. Appellant was 
in attendance at those proceedings and watched and listened with con-
siderable interest on that day prior to being called up as the 56th 
case on the calendar. Appellant observed case after case being cal-
led up by the Judge where neither party to the action appeared. 
Appellant has counted some forty-five (45) out of the seventy (70) 
cases scheduled to be heard to Show Cause on May 19 that were sum-
marily dismissed because the parties failed to appear. And accord-
ing to Appellant's reading of the record, Judge Medley dismissed 
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every one of those forty-five (45) cases without prejudice. This means 
that the matter of Slater v. State of Utah was a very unique case as 
it related to 45 other cases scheduled to be heard in Third District 
Court by Judge Medley on May 19, 1993. Slater was the only case to be 
dismissed with prejudice out of 45 other cases dismissed without pre-
judice. (Perhaps the only one out of 7J) others, since the final dis-
position would be decided later in the remaining cases). 
Needless to say, if a litigant stands alone as one out of 45 or 
one in 70, the odds of being singled out to this degree by a Court of 
law for such a severe sanction so completely unwarranted is almost be-
yond belief. 
Appellant's attempt to explain to Judge Medley about his reason-
ing to file a Motion to Dismiss, when appearing on May 19, must have 
seemed a bit pathetic to the practicing lawyers who were still in 
the courtroom — if not a joke. (Could that be the reason for only 
2 cases being scheduled for the morning of June 7?). 
The bottom line to all of the foregoing is simply this: When Ap-
pellant was issued a Court Order to Show Cause, he obeyed that Order 
and showed up — and explained to the Court what he intended to do — 
he would, for sound reasons, not press his Petition further. Instead, 
he would move to dismiss his case from the active Court files. 
Appellant had every reason to believe that he was doing the right 
thing. The Court was endeavoring to resolve one of its pending cases, 
and Appellant was cooperating by appearing and showing just cause as 
ordered. Without being schooled in the law, or holding membership in 
the local Bar Assn., how was Appellant supposed to know that when 
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lawyers or their clients change their minds about pursuing a legal 
action, one very easy way out is by simply failing to appear at a 
Show Cause hearing. Presto, the case is over with and no one suffers 
any lasting damage. (However, the vast majority of citizens would 
agree with Appellant regarding these kinds of "quick-fixes", perhaps 
not as they specifically relate to dismissals, but in most plea-
bargaining schemes, such shortcuts tend to undermine the entire ju-
diciary. For example, plea-bargaining in the criminal justice system, 
particularly in New York City, has become a mockery!). 
When Appellant appeared before Judge Medley the first time on 
May 19, it should have been fully apparent to him, (and undoubtedly 
was), that here was a prose litigant who is going about this matter 
entirely the wrong way. Appellant submits that, as a presiding jurist 
in one of this State's District Courts, Judge Medley had a solemn duty 
to protect the rights of this prose litigant and not permit, let alone 
endorse and Order such a miscarriage of justice as took place in his 
courtroom on June 7, 1993. Such an abuse of discretion would not have 
been attempted if Appellant had been represented by competent counsel. 
Does this mean that all litigants who cannot afford to be represented 
by a lawyer are doomed to fall victim to a biased and prejudicial legal 
system? It is a sad day for this country if that has become the pre-
vailing standard. 
"It seems anomalous and unfair that a plaintiff who, when notified 
of the impending dismissal of his case, moved promptly (though unsuc-
cessfully) to avoid the penalty, should find himself, by defendant's 
belated action, in a worse position than if he had done nothing and 
permitted his action to be dismissed without protest." Once again 
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quoting a pertinent excerpt from Chief Federal Judge Kirkpatrick's 
noteworthy decision in the Ordnance Gauge case, supra, 21 F.R.D. at 
p. 577 (E.D. Penn.1958). An important passage from Circuit Judge Mc 
Laughlin's opinion in Peardon v. Chapman, supra, also deserves re-
peating at this point: "Based on the Court's first expression it would 
seem that appellant anticipated nothing more drastic than a dismissal 
without prejudice. With no warning of the Court's uncommunicated 
change of thought as to dismissal, she was not afforded an opportunity 
of protecting her cause of action." See 169 F.2d at p. 913 (3rd Cir.f48). 
Case law teaches that if Appellant had foreseen the impending 
sanction about to be imposed, he could have avoided such an adverse 
measure by simply filing a Motion for a second Scheduling Conference 
and then press the case forward. That would certainly have been a 
better alternative than suddenly looking down the barrel of a Court-
ordered Dismissal with prejudice! But nine out of ten prose liti-
gants would be completely unaware of such legal maneuvers, with this 
Appellant among the majority — at least he was at the outset of this 
dismissal litigation. 
SUMMARY 
What follows is a list of the major points in support of Appel-
lant's position presented in this appeal: 
(1) The State filed no opposition to Appellant's Motion to Dis-
miss "without" prejudice. No objection was raised in writing prior 
to the Court hearing. Even then, the first mention of a dismissal 
"with" prejudice came from Judge Medley, not counsel for the Respon-
dents. Therefore, Appellant was caught completely by surprise, un-
prepared to present either case law or cite other legal authority 
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when the Court permitted little or no time for an adequate rebuttal 
or argument in support of Appellant's position. (See TRANSCRIPT, Seel 
in Addendum). 
(2) This case never reached the merits, a vitally important 
factor totally disregarded by the Court below. 
(3) The State submitted no pleadings other than its Answer. Thus, 
the record reveals that the State was under no burden or any pressure 
from Appellant throughout these proceedings. (See DOCKET REPORT, Sec. 
6 in Addendum). 
(4) Why should Appellant be made a victim for voluntarily moving 
to dismiss his suit and doing so without prejudice when the Respon-
dents had suffered no harm as a result of the action? 
(5) If the Courts are permitted to penalize a plaintiff whenever 
he or she voluntarily moves for an early dismissal of a legal action, 
particularly at the threshold of a case prior to discovery or any 
further litigation in the matter, does that not constitute a direct 
threat to a citizen's right to "Petition the Government" which is 
guaranteed in the First Amendment? Is it not also a denial of "Due 
Process" mandated under the Fourteenth Amendment if res judicata is 
imposed following a Dismissal with prejudice that was unwarranted? 
(6) The Court below arbitrarily chose to dismiss this case "with" 
prejudice although, during a Show Cause hearing where Appellant ap-
peared as ordered, some 45 cases were summarily dismissed without 
prejudice simply because the parties failed to appear at the hearing! 
(7) Why should the parties in 45 other cases be granted dis-
missals without prejudice by Court Order, simply because in the ma-
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jority of those cases neither party bothered to show up as ordered 
by the Court, while Appellant took the time and effort to file a 
Motion with the Court to dismiss his action, stating sound reasons 
and just cause for not pursuing the matter any further at this time, 
all of which was done in good faith and in compliance with all of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, both State and Federal? 
(8) And yet the Court chose to dismiss .Appellant's case "with" 
prejudice — a judicial action taken in only one out of 45 cases on 
the same day's Court calendar. Is such a decision not discriminatory? 
Is it not a violation of "Equal Protection" of the laws as mandated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment? 
(9) If the lower Court's decision in this matter was not an 
abuse of judicial discretion, then surely it must fall within the 
category of a "misuse of judicial authority", and subject to reversal 
on appeal. 
(10) Appellant can see no justification in the Court below order-
ing that this case be dismissed "with" prejudice, other than it taking 
an overly protective position in behalf of the Respondents. But such 
judicial adversity directed toward the Petitioner in this matter was 
completely unwarranted. Surely, this Court must conclude, even though 
the Court below did not, that this working-class citizen of only mod-
est means, was no match in a Court of law against all of the power 
and resources of the Respondents, namely, the State of Utah and two 
administrative agencies therein. The duty of the trial Court was to 
be unbiased and show no favoritism to either side, regardless of rank 
or financial position of the parties involved. 
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CONCLUSION 
"The courts have frequently warned that 'dismissal with prejudice 
is a drastic sanction to be applied only in extreme situations.1 Indeed 
there are constitutional limitations upon the power of a court, even 
in aid of its own valid processes, to dismiss an action without afford-
ing a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause. 
For this reason the appellate courts scrutinize very carefully dismis-
sals with prejudice made on these grounds. They have allowed dismissal 
with prejudice 'only in the face of a clear record of delay or contum-
acious conduct by the plaintiff,' or, as another court put it, 'upon 
a serious showing of willful default.' 
For these reasons the courts hold that 'except in extreme circum-
stances , the court should first resort to the wide range of lesser 
sanctions which it may impose upon the litigant or the derelict attor-
ney, or both,' before ordering dismissal with prejudice. Frequently, 
probably usually, failure to comply with an order of the court, or 
with the rules, or failure to prosecute will be the fault of the attor-
ney rather than the party. But it is entirely clear that the party 
cannot avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of his freely 
chosen attorney. At the same time a host of cases evidence the re-
luctance of the courts to bar a party from trial on the merits of his 
claim because of the errors of his legal representatives. In such 
situations, either on the original motion to dismiss or on a motion 
to vacate the dismissal, the courts frequently have found that less 
drastic sanctions, such as dismissal without prejudice or putting the 
case at the foot of the calendar, would be adequate." (Emphasis added) 
(See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol.9, Ch.7, 
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"Dismissal of Actions", Section 2369 at pages 193 thru 197). 
Section 11 under Article I of the Constitution of Utah, titled, 
"Courts open — Redress of injuries," reads as follows: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party," 
Appellant takes tills Section of Utah's Constitution literally 
just as it was written. The forthright language makes it obvious that 
the Legislators who wrote and voted for this provision to become part 
of the Constitutional law of the State, did so to insure that Courts 
under State jurisdiction should be prevented from riding rough-shod 
over Utah's citizens seeking justice in the State judicial system. 
The last part of Section 11 deserves a second reading: ". . .and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tri-
bunal in this State, by himself or counsel, . ." By including these 
words, the Legislature was making it clear that nobody was to be bar-
red from full access to the Courts of this State, either with or 
without an attorney. ". . .every person . .shall have remedy by due 
course of law. . ." (Emphasis added) 
When Article I, Section 11, of Utah's Constitution is coupled 
with the Right to Petition, guaranteed under the First Amendment, and 
then with the Equal Protection and Due Process provisions mandated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, Appellant 
firmly believes that he is fully supported by, not only the Constitu-
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tional provisions of this State, but also by the mandates set forth 
in the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the basic laws of this coun-
try. All of these laws, which are fundamental, are in place to pro-
tect the rights of individual citizens going before our Courts — 
both State and Federal — to guarantee an unbiased, full and fair 
hearing of disputes in contention — which this citizen was denied. 
Abuse of Discretion 
Whenever the record reveals that a Court has invoked certain 
legal moves that are manipulative in behalf of one side in a case, 
and particularly when the losing litigant is prose, usually lacking 
courtroom skills or a full knowledge of the law, especially those 
procedural ploys known only among practicing lawyers and the Courts, 
can it be candidly claimed that our system of justice is fair and 
unbiased? Or, at times do the facts in some cases make it obvious 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, that a Court has taken advantage of a 
litigant who had depended upon the CourtTs integrity and authority 
to protect his or her Constitutional rights? 
When that trust is broken through such clandestine, legal man-
euvers, can a Court legitimately defend itself against the charge of 
abuse of judicial discretion? The lower Court's dismissal of Ap-
pellant's action with prejudice must be reversed — justice demands 
no less. 
DATED this / *7 ~ day of December, 1993. 
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